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ABSTRACT 
It is a common assumption that foreign aid has to benefit recipient countries, by, among 
other things, stimulating growth, reducing poverty and improving governance. While 
Africa has received massive inflows of aid since the 1960s, the Continent is still saddled 
with a number of challenges. These include, poor economic performance, growing 
poverty, a high level of corruption, poor governance and a general deterioration in the 
quality of life of its people. The contradiction between the assumption and reality has 
led, in recent years, to a raging debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid in mitigating 
Africa’s underdevelopment. This dissertation examines some of the dominant 
arguments in this debate, and shows that while foreign aid has been beneficial to Africa 
in some respects, its negative impact on the Continent’s economic growth and general 
development should not be discounted. For this reason, Africa should seriously 
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 1.1 Title  
Foreign aid in Africa: an analysis of costs and benefits. 
 
1.2  Background to the research 
Prospects for economic growth in much of Africa looked promising following the 
demise of colonialism in the 1960s. Economic growth measured by estimated per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicated that in the first half of the century the 
Continent’s1 growth was significant; it overtook that of Asia by 1950.2 By the 1960s, a 
growth rate of 7% was recorded, which surpassed that of the countries of the Pacific 
region.3 The immediate post-independence period was marked by “political self-
determination in Africa [,] and economic growth [,] proceeding hand-in-hand”.4  
However, the tide was reversed when, between 1965 and 1990, several 
countries endured negative per capita growth; in comparison, East Asia’s per capita 
growth reached 5%, and Latin America’s 2%.5 By the 1980s, per income GDP had 
declined by 5% below the average of all low-income developing countries; and between 
1990-1994 it declined by a further 6.2%.6 By 2003, the World Bank (WB) estimated that 
per capita GDP in East Asia was five times higher than that of Africa.7 In 2005, it was 
estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa, a region with 10% of the world’s population, 
produces a dismal 1% of global GDP.8  
                                                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, the Continent refers to the African Continent, comprised of 53 countries. 
2 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “Monitoring the world economy” 
(Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995) 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Monitoring_the_world/1995_Monitoring_the_World/Chapter1.pdf 
[accessed 16 December 2010]. 
3 W. Easterly, and R. Levine, “Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (1997): 1203. 
4 P. Collier, and J. Gunning, “Why has Africa grown slowly?” Journal of Economic Perspective 13, no. 3 
(1999): 3-22. 
5 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s growth tragedy,” 1203.  
6 P. Collier, and J. Gunning, “Explaining African economic performance,” Journal of Economic Literature 37,  
(1999): 64. 
7 Ndulu, Challenges of African growth, 4. 
8 W. Easterly, “Can foreign aid save Africa?” Clemens Lecture Series. Minnesota: Saint John’s University 
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Foreign aid is dispensed to stimulate economic growth.9 Following the precedent 
found in the literature of foreign aid, this dissertation defines foreign aid or official 
development assistance (ODA) as does the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): foreign aid is the 
transfer of concessional resources from one government to another, or from a 
government to an international aid agency or a nongovernmental organisation which, in 
turn, transfers those resources to poor countries.10 The qualifying criteria for foreign 
aid are three-fold: “(i) it has to be undertaken by official agencies; (ii) it has to have the 
promotion of economic development and welfare as its main objective; and (iii) it has to 
have a ‘grant element’ of 25 per cent or more”.11 
 Approximately a quarter of global aid intended to meet the Millenuim 
Development Goals (MDGs) was allocated to Africa.12 In fact, Africa receives the largest 
share of foreign aid. Since the mid-1970s, foreign aid to Africa has been allocated to 
meet “development needs, oil price shocks, harvest failures, world economic recession 
and the African development crisis”.13 According to the Economic Commission of Africa 
(ECA), aid represents the largest single capital flow into Africa; it exceeds foreign direct 
investments (FDI), as well as remittances.14 Aid commitments have fluctuated over the 
years. Net ODA commitments increased from an average of US$4.9 billion in the 1970s, 
to US$12.45 billion in the 1980s; and increased to US$25.2 billion in 1990.15 Between 
1995-2004, total net aid dropped to US$23.4 billion, compared to the US$27.3 billion 
received between 1985-1974.16 Of the $10 billion of real net ODA that was allocated to 
Africa in 1971, 80% was earmarked for sub-Saharan Africa, and 0.4% for North Africa. 
By 1990, when real aid disbursements reached their peak at US$32.9 billion, US$23 
                                                     
9 M. Hlavac, Determinants of multilateral official development assistance: Evidence from a panel study of 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2. 
10 C. Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So much to do, so little done (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 36. 
11 R. Cassen, Does aid work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 2. 
12 H. Abbas, Aid to Africa: Redeemer or coloniser? (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2009), vii; B. Abegaz 
“Multilateral development aid for Africa,” Economic Systems 29 (2005): 434. 
13 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “Twenty-five years of Development 
Cooperation: A Review, 1985 Report”, (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1985). 
14 Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) Economic Report on Africa 2003: Accelerating the pace of 
development (Addis Ababa: Economic Commission of Africa, 2004), 51. 
15 E. Loots, “Aid and development in Africa: The debate, the challenges and the way forward,” South 
African Journal of Economics 74, no. 3 (2006): 365. 
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billion was allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, compared to US$9 billion for North 
Africa.17 
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have received more than US$30 million in 
foreign aid over the past four decades.18 Yet, despite the aid, the region and the 
Continent continue to experience declines in real per capita income for a significant 
portion of the population; public and private capital accumulation have had a modest 
impact on economic growth; returns on investments show little improvement; and, 
there have been frequent eruptions of  political instability.19 The region has “fallen 
behind the rest of the developing world by virtually any measure”, including receding to 
the margins of global affairs in trade, production and FDI. 20 The Continent has been, 
and continues to be, home to the largest number of collapsed, failed or failing states in 
the world, even though it possesses an abundance of material and human resources.21 
  Historically, Africa’s economic growth has been regarded as aid dependent.22 
This has, of course, led to vigorous arguments as traditionally, aid is viewed as a 
temporary intervention which is meant in the long-term, to facilitate self-reliance for 
the recipient.23 The persistence of aid, combined with its failure to achieve growth and 
development, are the reasons why foreign aid has occupied a central position in the 
deliberations of scholars, policy makers and governments concerning the environment 
necessary to support Africa’s economic growth. Contention surrounds a number of 
factors, inter alia, the effect (if any) that foreign aid has had on economic growth, 
governance, and development. This dissertation recognises, and argues, that foreign aid 
has yielded both positive and negative impacts on growth, development and governance 
throughout Africa.  
 
                                                     
17 Loxley and Sackey, Aid effectiveness in Africa, 165.  
18 T. Moss, “Current issues in development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa”, Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Regional Overview, (2005): 4. 
19 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s growth tragedy,” 1203; S. Devarajen, W. Easterly, and H. Pack, “Low 
investment is not the constraint on African Development,” Economic Development Cultural Change 51 
(2004): 547-571; Collier and Gunning, “Why has Africa grown,” 3-22. 
20 J. Carlsson, G. Somelekae and N. van de Walle, Foreign aid in Africa: Learning from country experiences 
(Sweden:  Motala Grafiskam 1997), 7; Calderisi, The trouble with Africa, 2. 
21 W. Zartman, “The African State,” in Towards Africa’s renewal, ed. J. Senghor, and N. Poku, 17. (England: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007). 
22 Loxley and Sackey, Aid effectiveness in Africa, 163.  
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1.3 Statement of the problem  
Foreign aid disbursements are one of a number of responses, that donors have tried, in 
order to assist Africa to meet a myriad of challenges. These challenges are said to 
include negative economic growth, weak governments, poverty, unemployment, poor 
standards of health and deplorable education levels.24 Foreign aid to Africa has a long 
history, dating back to the early 1960s, the years that marked the birth of independence 
for many African countries.25 Over the past half-century, Africa has received 
approximately US$1 trillion of foreign aid, yet poverty has increased, and economic 
growth has stagnated.26 The current average per capita income for the Continent is 
lower than at the end of the 1960s.27  
This dissertation highlights the fact that despite there being a long history of aid, 
and aid being justified as a strategy for growth and poverty reduction, aid seems to 
failed to show progress on both accounts for much of Africa.28  
This raises a number of questions: Is foreign aid responsible for Africa’s 
continued poor economic performance? Has Africa become dependent on foreign aid? 
Has foreign aid promoted growth and in so doing  averted further underdevelopment? 
Is foreign aid to blame for the breakdown of accountability between governments and 
their constituencies, or, has foreign aid only served to advance the interests of donor 
nations? 
 
1.4  Research question 
What have been the costs and benefits of foreign aid in Africa? 
 
1.5  Methodology 
This research uses a qualitative method, a literature study. A thorough survey of the 
literature was conducted, in order to fully grasp the issues pertinent to the foreign aid 
debate. 
                                                     
24 J. Manor, Aid that works: Successful development in fragile states (Washington D.C: The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007), xi. 
25 J. Glennie, The trouble with aid: Why less could mean more for Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 10. 
26 P. Pomerantz,  Aid effectiveness in Africa: Developing trust between donors and governments (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2004), 1. 
27 Pomerantz, Aid effectiveness in Africa, 1. 
28 S. Amin, “Aid for development,” in Aid to Africa: Redeemer or Coloniser, ed. H. Abbas, and Y. Niyiragira, 
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The researcher consulted various types of publications. These included academic 
journals, books and reports, which dealt with foreign aid. In addition, the researcher 
referred to policy documents, surveys and   reports prepared by international and 
regional organisations, for example, the United Nations (UN), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC); and reports and publications from key donor 
agencies, such as the DAC.  
 
 1.6 Research objective 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to analyse the costs and benefits of foreign 
aid in Africa, in order to gain greater insight into the Continent’s economic growth 
dilemma. It is hoped that greater insight will lead to effective strategies to address the 
challenges that have prevented the Continent from advancing. 
 
1.7 Chapter layout 
The dissertation is divided into the following six chapters:  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the background to the problem that this dissertation seeks to 
address. The research question, methodology and research objectives are also indicated.  
 
Chapter 2: Background to Africa’s foreign aid needs: an analysis 
This chapter highlights the underlying factors which predispose Africa to rely on foreign 
aid.  
 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
This chapter provides a discussion of the literature on foreign aid. A number a themes 
feature in the literature. The dominant themes include the aid-growth relationship, aid 
effectiveness and the impact that foreign aid has on governments and governance. 
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Chapter 4: Costs and benefits of foreign aid 
This chapter identifies the costs and benefits that foreign aid has brought to the 
Continent.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
As the final section, this chapter provides a summary of the arguments made in the 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO AFRICA’S FOREIGN AID NEEDS: AN ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite receiving foreign aid, international engagements and numerous ‘grand plans’ 
over several decades, average incomes in most African countries have only improved 
marginally from where they were in the 1960s.29 Economic performance has been poor; 
poverty has increased, food insecurity has become more acute, weak government 
institutions have become more prevalent, and the disease burden is widespread.30 
These challenges are complex and multi-dimensional; they involve historic, economic, 
social, cultural, political, governance and environmental factors. 
Africa’s growth lags behind that of other regions by almost every measure.31 
According to recent projections, the majority of African countries are unlikely to achieve 
most of the MDGs. The MDGs are set, among other things, on eradicating poverty and 
hunger, achieving universal education, improving maternal health, and combating 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 
malaria and other diseases.32 “For the masses of Africa, incomes are lower than they 
were two decades ago, health prospects are poorer, malnutrition is widespread, and 
infrastructures and social institutions are fast breaking down”.33 Instead of becoming 
“entangled in the ‘treadmill’ of international trade” and development, Africa has fallen 
behind and is caught up in cycles of poverty and economic underperformance.34 
There is no shortage of theoretical attempts to explain Africa’s poor economic 
performance. One of the earliest accounts was Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory. 
According to this theory, Africa’s position on the periphery of the global economy is to 
blame for its continued underperformance, relative to those at or near the centre.35 The 
Dependency Theory, developed in the 1950s, provides a similar perspective on the 
                                                     
29 Morton, The poverty of nations, 1. 
30 Manor, Aid that works, xi. 
31 P. Englebert, “Pre-colonial institutions, post-colonial states, and economic development in tropical 
Africa”, Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2000): 7. 
32 R. Thiele, P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher, “Do donors target aid in line with the Millenuim Development 
Goals?” UNU-WIDER Discussion Dissertation, no. 2007/04 (2007): 1. 
33 C. Ake, Democracy and development in Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1996), 173. 
34 Calderisi, The trouble with Africa, 3.  
35 I. Wallerstein, The modern world-system: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world 
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paradox of why “economic growth in advanced industrialised countries did not 
necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries”.36 According to this Theory, this 
situation was the result of a historical process, that altered the “structure of the world 
economy such that it favour[ed] some countries to the detriment of others[,] and 
limit[ed] the development possibilities of the subordinate economies”.37 Consequently, 
Africa, Asia and Latin America have become subordinate to the developing nations, as 
well as instruments for leveraging the growth and expansion of the latter.38  
Whilst African states are not homogenous, and have different histories, 
geographies, population sizes and economies, there are characteristics that are common 
to most. It is argued that the common characteristics are responsible for the Continent’s 
vulnerability to a number of challenges, and have thus created opportunities for a flood 
of foreign aid into Africa.39 Most African countries have a “neo-colonial economic 
structure, [which is] dominated by agriculture, extraction of raw materials, and a 
sizeable public sector”; the export sector also retains a heavy imprint of the colonial 
past.40 Most African countries have heavy international debt burdens as a result of a 
history of heavy inflows of aid, and difficulty repaying foreign loans. This combination 
has exacerbated aid dependence across the Continent.41   
A number of factors have been used to justify foreign aid. These include Africa’s 
colonial past, poor economic growth, weak states, crises of legitimacy and political 
instability, poverty, widespread disease including HIV/AIDS, lack of clean water and 
sanitation, environmental degradation, untransformed agricultural practices and food 
insecurity. Whilst it is recognised that there may be other factors, those included in this 
dissertation have featured in the literature on foreign aid, and in particular in relation to 
Africa’s weak economic growth and development.   
 
                                                     
36
 V. Ferrero, “Dependency theory: An introduction,” (1996): 1 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm [accessed 10 January 2010]. 
37
 Ferrero, “Dependency theory: An introduction,” 3.  
38
 Ferrero, “Dependency theory: An introduction,” 3. 
39 H. Hansen, G. Mills, and J. Herbst, Africa beyond aid (Johannesburg: The Bernthurst Foundation, 2009),  
18. 
40 Carlsson, Somelekae, and van de Walle, Foreign aid in Africa, 14. 
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2.2 Colonial legacy  
Africa has a long history of colonialism. The 15th century C.E. saw the beginning of 
European voyages of exploration that took adventurers, merchants and soldiers across 
the seas to the West, South and East of the African Continent.42 Various European 
nations fought each other and African peoples and rulers for access and then control of 
African lands and resources.43 By the beginning of the Twentieth Century most of Africa 
was under the control of European nations.44 The first to arrive were the Portuguese; 
the French British, German, Dutch, Spanish and Italians followed in the course of the 
next five centuries. It didn’t take long for the colonisers to establish markets, extract 
resources and infuse their ideas, technology, as well as political and ideological systems, 
which continue to influence Africa decades after independence.45 One argument 
presented in this dissertation is that “the process of colonization of most of Africa by 
Europe also had a major impact on the local authorities, altering the evolution of 
political institutions and putting Africa on a trajectory that almost certainly contributed 
to the disappointing development outcomes seen since independence”.46 It is evident 
that several modern African countries have been unable to transform the state and its 
institutions which were inherited from their colonial predecessors. As such, economic 
growth has not been achieved because the colonial state’s centralisation of power was 
designed to extract resources to benefit the colonisers.47   
Newly independent African states inherited colonial states that had been 
organised with the purpose of exporting crude materials to European and American 
factories. This was made possible through low-cost labour, which ultimately guaranteed 
colonial enterprise profitability.48 This “extractive relationship” between the colonial 
powers and African states had a devastating impact on the Continent’s domestic 
resource base. During the colonial period significant quantities of Africa’s mineral and 
agricultural resources were exported by the colonial powers. The unequal balance of 
                                                     
42 R. Findlay, “The roots of divergence: Western economic history in comparative perspectives,” The 
African Economic Review 82, no. 2 (1992): 158 
43 Findlay, “The roots of divergence,” 160. 
44 Findlay, “The roots of divergence,” 160 
45 T. Moss, African development: Making sense of the issues and actors (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2007), 19-26. 
46 Moss, African development: Making sense, 19. 
47
 Englebert, “Pre-colonial institutions, post-colonial states,” 9. 
48 D. Kalyalya, K. Mhlanga, A. Seidman, and J. Semboja, Aid and development in Southern Africa: Evaluating 
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trade to the economic model of the colonial past continued after independence. Africa is 
still an exporter of primary (agriculture and mining) goods whose prices have fallen 
over time, and is an importer of manufactured ‘value added’ goods whose prices have 
tended to increase.49 Africa’s position on the global trade game-board has not 
stimulated economic growth.  
The colonial power imposed a tax on agriculture and made it difficult for the 
dispossessed of fertile lands to sell their African cash crops. This made it impossible for 
most Africans to make a decent earning by means of agriculture, forcing many to 
migrate in search of wages.50 The result of this was “a stratified society with a sharply 
skewed income distribution”, which the newly independent states inherited.51 At 
independence, the major tasks facing African states were readdressing the unequal 
income distribution and fostering economic growth. These tasks have posed great 
challenges for many states, which required expertise and knowledge which many 
African statesmen did not pose as a result of colonialism.  
Colonialism had a devastating impact in Africa. Not only did it alter domestic 
markets and labour, it also caused a decline in the performance of the Continent’s 
economies. The newly independent states simply did not have the financial means, or 
the comparative advantage required to establish and create enabling environments to 
reverse the burdens of colonialism, or at the very least to compete in global trade. 
Foreign aid was seen as the means to reverse the damage resulting from colonialism.   
 
2.3 Africa’s growth experience 
Africa’s growth trajectory has been marked by low or negative trends. One explanation 
for the disappointing performance is the Continent’s major savings gap.52 The low 
savings combined with a weak financial sector, the changing international economic 
environment and unpredictable growth conditions in Africa, have compromised Africa’s 
growth.53 The average savings rate in Africa overall is significantly low, averaging 19% 
between 1965 and 1973, and 23% between 1974 and 1980.54 Economists hold the view 
                                                     
49 J. Graaf, Poverty and development (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37-38; Ferrero, 
“Dependency theory: An introduction,” 3.  
50 Kalyalya, Mhlanga, Seidman, and Semboja, Aid and development, 42-43. 
51 Kalyalya, Mhlanga, Seidman, and Semboja, Aid and development, 42-43. 
52 Lancaster,  Aid to Africa, 19.  
53
 Ndulu, Challenges of African growth, 1-200.  
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that savings and investment are key to spurring growth in developing countries.55 More 
specifically, it is often prescribed that a quarter of national budgets should be invested 
to initiate and sustain growth. Foreign aid has been justified as a tool to close that gap 
and therefore serve as a catalyst for fuelling growth.  
Economic growth, which has been defined as the “change that includes both 
growth in national production and income and an improvement in the standard of living 
of the poor”, has fluctuated since independence; it has shown little improvement over 
the last three decades.56 This is disappointing because during the same time between 
the 1960s and 1980s, Korea recorded increases in real per capita income of over 
700%.57 Africa’s growth record shows a low potential for growth. Growth averaged at 
1.7% per annum in the 1970s and 1980s, it improved slightly during the 1980s to 2.3% 
per annum. The significant population growth averaging 2.5% per annum in 1960 and 
over 3% per annum in the 1980s was an added strain which curbed economic growth.58 
It was envisioned that foreign aid would reverse the low levels of economic growth. 
Whilst there is great diversity among African states, many are characterised by 
poor macroeconomic structures, which have failed to foster increased rates of economic 
growth.59 Other regions of the world continue to outperform those in Africa. In 2005, 
the GNP of OECD countries was US$28,086 compared to US$528 in Africa.60 The 2006 
African Development Report recorded the Continent’s decline in real per capita GDP 
growth of 0.2% between 2004 and 2005.61 
According to Nafziger, the roots of Africa’s economic crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s can be traced to the Continent’s “inability to adjust to the 1973-74 oil shock, 
exacerbated by a credit cycle in which states over-borrowed at negative real interest 
rates in the mid- to late 1980s”.62 During that period, many countries were forced to 
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resort to the international financial institutions (IFIs) for foreign aid in the form of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).63 Countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue 
to pay external debt with significant interest. In 2006, the region’s debt balance stood at 
US$303.6 billion.64 Africa’s debt burden has been a major impediment to increasing 
investment and savings, and eradicating poverty as resources are diverted to servicing 
debt rather than stimulating growth and development.65  
Even though some countries on the Continent experienced growth between 1977 
and 1999, per capita GNP growth was insignificant  or negative.66 Countries such as 
Egypt, Botswana, Mauritius, Swaziland and the Seychelles recorded 4% growth per 
annum, while Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania and Morocco recorded a less promising rate of 
2.4%.67   
 A combination of poor macroeconomic structures, low savings and meagre 
investments have increased Africa’s vulnerability and set the Continent on a negative 
growth path. This background has been used to justify the massive infusion of foreign 
aid.   
  
2.4 The weak state 
Africa has the unfortunate label of being home to the largest number of failing states.68 
According to Jackson and Rosberg, “state institutions and organisations are less 
developed in the sub-Saharan region than almost anywhere else”.69 The formation of 
political systems-a pivotal prerequisite for stimulating economic growth-has not been 
realised for many African states.  
Much of the socio-economic challenges facing Africa are associated with bad 
governance, which in turn has hindered economic growth and investment, increased 
transaction costs and diverted public funds from delivering public goods.70 Mills states 
that the question of leadership and the failure of African leaders to stimulate growth are 
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largely to blame for the abject poverty that continues to exist in Africa.71 In most cases, 
government leaders have failed to distribute wealth among the poor, and instead have 
directed it to the elite. Nigeria is such a case, where oil wealth has enriched the elite 
minority.72 It is estimated that 1% of the population has benefited from 80% of Nigeria’s 
oil wealth, while the number of people living on less than a dollar a day continued to 
escalate from 19 million (of a population of 70 million) in 1970, to 90 million in 2000.73  
Africa has failed to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by 
globalisation, because the Continent has been laggard in integrating with the global 
economy.74 Calderisi has taken this point to the extreme by suggesting that the “world 
economy is against Africa”.75 This is demonstrated by the continually increasing rate at 
which the Continent faces marginalisation in global trade, investment and production.76 
FDI has slumped to less that 1% for the Continent.77 Africa’s share of world exports 
have decreased: between 1970 and 1980, Africa’s exports grew by 2.8%, exports from 
South Asia increased by 3.6%.78 Africa’s narrow export range limits prospects for 
international trade.79 Technological advancement which Lim cites as a key driver for 
economic growth for any country, is limited in Africa.80 “When comparing the relative 
contributions of technological progress and factors of production to growth in real per 
capita GDP in developed countries between 1960 and 1985, 75% of it was due to 
technology”.81 During that period, the figure for developing countries as a group, was 
14%, whilst Africa it was a disconcerting 0%.82 According to van Niekerk, this statistic 
explains why Africa is unable to compete in the global economy.83  
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The recent global financial crisis has devastated Africa’s economy. The 
Continent’s major economies-which account for 65% of regional GDP-have been 
affected the worst.84 As global trade collapsed, “South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Angola have all experienced a significant decrease in their GDP growth 
rates – even up to 99% in the case of Angola (from 2007 to 2009)”.85 The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that collectively, Africa’s growth rate declined by over 
70%, from 3.6% in 2007 to 1.7% in October 2009.86 
 From the above, it is hard to believe that Africa has received significant 
quantities of foreign aid over many decades. In 1996, foreign aid worldwide totalled 
nearly US$55.5 million, of which a third (nearly US$17million) went to the countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa.87 Following commitments by the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Conference, 
calls have been made to double aid to Africa to US$50 million by 2010- yet total foreign 
aid had increased exponentially from US$2 000 million in 1970, to US$8 000 million in 
1980, US$17 00 million in 1990, and US$24 000 million in 2002.88 In 2005, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo received US$362 in aid per capita, Zambia US$81, Liberia 
US$72, Mozambique US$65, Namibia US$61, Mali US$51 and Guinea-Bissau US$50.89 
Yet, the Continent’s economic performance continues to be dismal.  
Even though foreign aid seeks to promote economic development, many 
accounts illustrate aid’s failure on both counts.90 Indeed the statistics presented above 
show little prospect for growth output. At the same time however, the recent World 
Bank Report titled Assessing aid: What works, what doesn’t and why, noted that foreign 
aid has “at times been a spectacular success and (at others) an unmitigated failure”.91 In 
Botswana’s case in the 1960s, as well Ghana in the 1990s, foreign aid transformed 
entire sectors, improving people’s access to schools, clean water, sanitation, electricity, 
health, infrastructure and development.92 On the other hand, cases such as Zaire (now 
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the Democratic Republic of Congo) showed little positive impact. Instead, the opposite 
seems to have been the result. There were no improvements in the lives of the citizenry. 
Corruption, the accumulation of wealth by the elites, misguided reports, theft and 
financial mismanagement were the order of the day.93  
 Most African states are characterised by weak institutions, ineffective 
government and questionable leadership, all of which have increased the Continent’s 
vulnerability and undermines its ability to tackle the challenge of economic growth. 
  
2.5 Crises of legitimacy and political instability 
Legitimacy is achieved when there is consensus over the rulers and the ‘rules’ within a 
system.94 In terms of this definition, many African states lack legitimacy. Goldsmith 
attributes the lack of legitimacy to the way in which independence was achieved.95 
Many countries “typically attained independence through agreements with the colonial 
powers, instead of earning it through the establishment of effective control over their 
populations”.96 The allegiance of the domestic populace has not yet been won in many 
African states.  
The frequent outbreak of civil wars and episodes of political instability are a 
manifestation of this crisis of legitimacy. Between 1958 and 1981 there had been more 
than 41 successful coups in 22 African countries.97 From 1981 to 1996, nearly 50% of 
African countries had experienced episodes of violent conflict; some had lasted just over 
a month, and some for more than 20 years. During the 1980s and 1990s, these conflicts 
claimed the lives of more than four million people, including seven heads of states. They 
have also swelled the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
across the Continent.98 In addition, the conflicts have “generally wrought destruction of 
property and human lives [that have] adversely affected the nascent institutions of 
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governance”.99 In short, the lack of legitimacy has compromised the capacity of states in 
Africa  to  respond effectively to the many challenges besetting the Continent.  
 In Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, the state’s legitimacy has been 
challenged by rebellion and internal lawlessness.100 According to Poku et al, in these 
states, “though government may be accepted, the political institutions through which its 
powers are exercised are often treated with remarkable indifference by large sections of 
the citizenry … [However,] the fact is that in large tracts of Africa the state is entirely 
absent – in physical presence as well as in the provision of basic services to the 
population, including of course security and development”.101   
Where there is on-going or repeated political instability it is not possible to 
“generate the necessary consensus … [that a government must have if it is to 
successfully carry out essential and often] painful reforms for long-term 
development”.102 In weak states or in states there government institutions are 
ineffective, the formulation and implementation of economic policies that encourage 
economic growth has proved impossible. It is for these reasons that a fifth the annual 
allocations of aid earmarked for the promotion of democracy (some US$2 billion) is 
directed to Africa.103 Much of this type of aid carries with it conditions that require a 
recipient government to implement vigorous reforms, which create institutions that will 
amongst others, stimulate economic growth and development.  
Political instability and conflict disrupt “economic activities as … [they are 
accompanied by the] destruction of economic infrastructure, degradation of the 
environment” and damage communication systems. Unstable countries do not attract 
investments from outside. All the above have failed to produce sustained economic 
growth.104 Ndulu notes that countries exposed to political instability have average 
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incomes 50% lower than those that do not.105 Similarly, investment ratios in physical 
and human capital have been proved to be 50% lower in conflict areas.106  
  It is clear, therefore, that Africa’s recent history of conflict and political 
instability has had negative consequences for economic growth.  
 
2.6 Ethnic diversity  
A strand of the literature proposes that the reason why weak institutions and poor 
policies exist in Africa s is because of the Continent’s  rich ethnic diversity.107 This view 
is echoed by Easterly and Levine who argue that “ethnic diversity has led to social 
polarisation and entrenched interest groups in Africa and has thereby increased the 
likelihood of selecting socially sub-optimal policies as ethnic representatives in 
government fail to internalize the entire social costs of the rent-creating policies they 
adopt”.108  
 Political conflict has been linked to the pervasiveness of  patronage in retaining 
control over the state and resources.109 Akokpari describes how many states have 
shown tendencies to “manipulate associated ethnic and chauvinistic sentiments to its 
advantage as well as to those within within their grouping, thereby excluding the so 
called ‘strangers’.110 The manifestation of patronage has been demonstrated in 
appointments based on ascriptive factors rather than merit. This has generated conflict 
amongst those who do not have access to the lines of power, which ultimately 
undermines growth.  
  
2.7 Poverty, disease, lack of clean water and sanitation 
Widespread and extreme poverty is a major challenge to Africa’s capacity to achieve 
sustained economic growth.111 Poverty has risen exponentially as a result of Africa’s 
poor economic and growth performance. According to Poku et al, 
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Africa is the only region to have regressed in terms of poverty in the last 40 years; 
extreme poverty is twice the average global rate and the actual number living in 
that condition has grown from 150 million to 300 million, more than 40% of the 
region’s population.112  
 
Though Africa is home to 10% of the global population, it is home to 30% of the world’s 
poor.113 In 2009, sub-Saharan Africa’s purchasing power parity (PPP) was an average 
annual income of US$1.681, 50% lower than the next poorest population, South Asia.114 
Malaria is endemic to much of Africa. Of the 300 million people who have 
contracted malaria worldwide, some 270 million (90%) cases are found in Africa. Most 
of the patients are children under the age of five.115 Poverty is one of the major factors 
for the extremely high prevalence in Africa. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
states that 37% of all cases of diarrhoeal illnesses occur in sub-Saharan Africa, only 50% 
receive oral hydration therapy; in Asia, 70% of cases receive treatment.116 
 The 2006 Human Development Report notes that ill health undermines 
productivity and economic growth, by “trapping vulnerable households in cycles of 
poverty”.117 Declines in health standards are associated with lack of access to clean 
water and sanitation; 314 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are affected. This has 
added to the pressure on governments to augment national health budgets. Many 
governments have been forced to seek foreign aid in order to rollout the necessary 
health programmes and projects.  
In recent decades, HIV/AIDS has emerged as one of Africa’s most serious health 
threats; it has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. In 1990, HIV/AIDS claimed lives 
at a rate of 10 people per minute, or about 5500 a day.118 By 1992, the WHO estimated 
that 3 million Africans were infected with HIV. By 1996, the figure had risen to 10 
million.119 In 2000, among 15-49 year olds, infection rate was 10% in Zimbabwe, 
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compared to 18% in Botswana. 120 The 2010 UNAIDS Global Report on Global AIDS 
Epidemic reports that in sub-Saharan Africa alone, 22.5 million adults and children are 
living with HIV, compared to 20.3 million in 2001. The figures for South and South-East 
Asia are 4.1 million and 3.8 million respectively. 121 Women and girls aged 15-25 years 
constitute more than 50% of people living with HIV. The Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS  (UNAIDS) recognises that in order to address this 
staggering statistic, “protecting women and girls from HIV means protecting [them 
from] gender-based violence and [by] promoting [their] economic independence from 
older men”.122 
 As a result of HIV/AIDS, the life expectancy of people in Africa is the only 
Continent with an average life expectancy of less than 60 years. Life expectancy in 
Swaziland is 30 years.123 HIV/AIDS “strikes people in the most productive age groups 
and is essentially 100% fatal”.124 HIV/AIDS has devastating implications for 
macroeconomic growth. A decline in life expectancy and an increase in mortality means 
a sizeable cut in the Continent’s working population, which in turn results in reduced 
economic productivity.125 Since more and more families have to draw on savings and 
investments in order to meet heavy medical expenses, there is less money for the 
education, health care and feeding of children. Ultimately, “prospects for longer-run 
economic growth and development will decline”.126 
  
2.9 The environment, agriculture and food insecurity 
The agriculture sector plays a pivotal role in Africa both in terms of its contribution to 
the GDP of most states, as well as a source of food for most countries. About 75% of 
Africa’s population are either engaged in or dependent on subsistence farming and 
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agriculture for their livelihood as well as their food. Yet, only 6% of the Continent’s land 
is arable given the highly mountainous topography.127 
 The AU noted that in 2006, the agricultural sector accounted for 60% of total 
employment, 20% total exports and 15% GDP. The importance of “accelerating 
agricultural growth in African countries is therefore crucial [,] not only for achieving 
food security and reducing hunger but also for generating employment and trade”.128 
Unfortunately, agriculture has stagnated in much of Africa, most countries that were 
previously self-sufficient in food production, now import food and are recipients of 
foreign aid. It is estimated that “a staggering 40% of all Africans go hungry … [and are] 
classified as extremely poor (surviving on less than 1 US$ a day)”.129 There is a need for 
Africa to diversify its economies and follow suit with global trends, according to which 
the agricultural sector should play a smaller role within economies.130   
African government’s commitments to transform policies, and reform land, to 
develop infrastructure and give access to rural farmers have yielded little results. 
Instead, efforts have distorted markets, and further contributed to a decline of 
agricultural production.131  
 Africa’s environment is historically vulnerable to frequent droughts and famines. 
In Lesotho for instance, recurrent droughts when seasonal rains fail, frequently affect 
food supply and production.132 The Lesotho government was forced to declare a state of 
famine between 2000 and 2002 because the rains did not fall.133 The 2006/7 crop 
season saw temperatures higher than the preceding five years and the lowest levels of 
precipitation in the past three decades.134 Erratic rainfall in a region that is dependent 
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on agriculture and vulnerable to food shortages, can only be augmented through foreign 
aid.  
 Domestic markets in Africa have increasingly become less able to meet the 
demand as a result of a decline in productivity. In the mid-1970s, Lesotho’s domestic 
market provided 50-70% of the nation’s food. In 1984, however, only 40% was 
produced; there was a further decline to only 30% by 2008. In 2003/4 a joint Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO)/and World Food Programme (WFP) Report stated that 
the domestic cereal supply, estimated at 118 200 tonnes, did not match the national 
consumption requirement of 320 700 tonnes.135 This situation meant that commercial 
imports which were projected at 288 700 tonnes, and food aid at 32 000 tonnes were 
needed. Even when taking into account the external contributions, there is still a 
sizeable gap and shortfall in Lesotho’s ability to meet the nation’s food requirements.136  
 As a Continent dependent on agriculture, whose markets are unable to meet 
domestic needs, and whose policies are inappropriate Africa is left vulnerable. Foreign 
aid is seen a a continued necessity in the midst of agricultural uncertainty and food 
insecurity.   
  Food insecurity is a major challenge across the Continent, both at a micro level 
(individuals and households) and macro level (for the entire population). In 2002, the 
SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC) estimated that 15.2 million 
people were in need of food in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
requiring up to 3 million tons of cereal to meet their nutritional requirements.137 
According to a 2005 FAO Report, Africa ranked highest in terms of levels of 
malnourishment, with almost 33% of the population or 200 million people considered 
to fall within that category.138 According to the Report, daily consumption of calories is 
below the recommended level of 2100 kcal for 33% of African countries: Ethiopia; 
Kenya; Rwanda; Tanzania; Angola; Madagascar; Mozambique; Zambia; and Sierra 
Leone. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Eritrea and Somalia have the lowest 
consumption level of only 1800 kcal.139  
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Food insecurity remains a major challenge for African countries if cyclical food 
shortages, which have negative consequences for hunger, health, social relationships 
and economic activity, are to be avoided.140 The causes for food insecurity are complex. 
On the supply side, low productivity has led to shortages of staple foods such as 
maize.141 Furthermore, a lack of investment in the agricultural sector, instability of 
global markets, and increasingly unfair trade environments have exacerbated food 
insecurity in Africa.142 Agricultural policies have depressed agricultural productivity in 
several countries, Zimbabwe and Zambia are examples. Unfavourable economic 
environments in Lesotho and Swaziland, and uncontrolled price variations in Malawi 
and Mozambique have compromised agricultural production.143 On the demand side, 
the problem of access to food is due to “the weak economic growth resulting from 
unsuccessful macro-economic policies; a poor balance of payments situation; highly 
skewed patterns of income and wealth distribution … [as a result of past] short-sighted 
colonial policies; high levels of unemployment and land tenure insecurity; the failure of 
governance, both as a lack of accountability and opposition to democratisation; and, 
financial management”.144 
 The lack of food security has in more recent decades been compounded by 
HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS has created a new category of highly vulnerable households who 
have incurred a significant reduction in livelihoods from subsistence farming.145 
According to the United Nations Commission for Africa, the impact that the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic has added new dimensions to food insecurity: “1) household-level shortages 
are attributable to adult morbidity and mortality, as is the rise in numbers of 
dependents; 2) loss of assets and skills results from increased adult mortality; 3) [an 
enlarged] burden of care for sick adults and children orphaned by AIDS; and 4) vicious 
interactions exist between malnutrition and HIV”.146 
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 According to Dubois, HIV/AIDS has increased vulnerability to food insecurity as 
it “slowly destroys the basic individual’s capabilities, i.e. their capacity to do things, by 
increasing the difficulty of going to work, cultivating fields, meeting their peers and, 
more generally, living correctly”.147 The UN estimated that in 2000, 9.6% of Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural labour force was lost, whilst Malawi experienced a loss of 5.8%. In terms of 
cattle production, Zimbabwe witnessed a decrease of 29%, 49% for vegetables, and 
61% for maize, all as a result of a member of a household dying from HIV/AIDS.148 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined Africa’s growth context ,which it is argued, has increased the 
Continent’s need for external assistance in the form of foreign aid. The chapter has shed 
some light onto certain features which are common to many African states, and that 
have predisposed the Continent to underperform economically and to stifle growth. 
These include Africa’s colonial history, weak states, crises of legitimacy, political 
instability, poverty, and disease.  
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3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a discussion of the literature on foreign aid. Among the 
dominating themes are aid effectiveness, the aid-growth relationship and aid’s impact 
on governments and governance. After decades of capital transfers in the form of 
foreign aid to Africa, little advancement seem to have been made in addressing the 
Continent’s challenges. This is despite the fact that foreign aid’s objectives are the 
promotion of economic growth and poverty reduction.149 Questions continue to be 
raised about the relationship between aid and growth, aid and governance, and how 
effective aid is in achieving these objectives. Whilst some are of the belief that foreign 
aid has been developmental and has yielded positive output in the African context, 
others assert that Africa’s growth has, in fact, been retarded by foreign aid. The 
literature on foreign aid can be classified into two broad categories - those that deal 
with its effectiveness, and those with the aid-growth relationship. It is fitting therefore, 
in this chapter to explore the debates raised currently in the literature.  
 Before entering the discussion, this section begins with a conceptual outline of 
foreign aid.  
 
3.2 Conceptualising foreign aid 
As mentioned earlier, the usage of the term foreign aid or ODA in this dissertation 
follows the official definition proposed by the DAC of the OECD. According to the 
definition, foreign aid is the transfer of concessional resources from one government to 
another or from a government to an international aid agency or a nongovernmental 
organization, which, in turn, transfers those resources to poor countries.150 
 Foreign aid falls within the broad category of official development finance (ODF), 
which includes all types of financial flows from the governments of developed countries 
and multilateral agencies to the developing world. Foreign aid and ODF can be classified 
as either bilateral or multilateral. The former is administered by agencies of donor 
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governments, and is tied, which usually means that it must be used to procure goods 
and services from the donor country. The latter-multilateral aid-is funded by 
contributions from wealthy countries and is administered by agencies such as the UNDP 
and the WB. The transfer of private concessional resources, military aid, credits for the 
promotion of a donor country’s exports, public resource transfers between prosperous 
countries, international bribes, tributes, or funding for covert action against another 
foreign organisation or government is not included in this definition.151   
Agencies recognized as contributors of ODA include the UN and UN Administered 
Funds, the European Commission (EC), the IMF, the WB, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), regional development banks and other multilaterals.152 
A number of observations can be made about foreign aid: that there are several 
types of aid; multiple reasons for giving aid; positive and negative impacts; and, aid can 
be in the best interest of donors and/or recipients. Foreign aid can be allocated in the 
form of cash (concessional loans or grants), in kind (e.g. food aid) or in the form of debt 
relief or cancellation of debt.153 Most aid has been in the form of monetary grants and 
loans.154 According to Lancaster, the main non-financial form of aid has been food, 
which is typically surplus agricultural production from major donor countries. Debt 
cancellation has constituted a significant component of foreign aid in Africa where a 
sizeable number of countries face heavy debt.155   
Foreign aid transfers fund an array of activities: “budgetary and balance of 
payments needs in recipient countries; investment projects and research activities; 
economic and political reform programs; technical advice and training; and, 
humanitarian relief”.156 Aid is intended to achieve various outputs, e.g. allowing the 
recipient government to expand activities they are already committed to, and by so 
doing, enable the recipient to use resources more effectively and productively, such as 
training government officials in technical programmes. Aid can also act as an incentive 
or as a payment for the recipient to “act in ways favoured by the donor by conditioning 
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it on desired behavior on the part of the recipient (e.g. adopting economic policy 
reforms or supporting the donor government’s position in international forums) [;] or 
reducing or eliminating it [aid] when recipients behave in ways unwelcome to the aid-
giving government”.157 In addition, Lancaster mentions that aid can be used to fund 
investment projects (e.g. schools, roads and infrastructure development) and 
programmes (e.g. economic policy reforms).158 
The justification for foreign aid has evolved over the years, but rests mainly on three 
factors which determine how the allocation is to be used: altruism; political ideology, 
foreign policy and commercial interests; and, economic development.159 Firstly, 
according to altruism, foreign aid represents a manifestation of donor concerns for the 
well-being of less developed countries, and seeks to reduce poverty and inequality in 
the world. Secondly, foreign aid has also been used as a means to advance and pursue 
foreign policy, and/or commercial and political ideologies. During the Cold War for 
instance, foreign aid was used to spread communism. In the same way, socialist donors 
promoted their ideologies and the adoption of socialist systems using aid. And finally, 
foreign aid has been seen as a tool to achieve greater economic development, among 
other development imperatives, such as: “poverty alleviation; the spread of democracy; 
gender issues; social development; and the expansion of markets (including providing a 
hospitable environment for foreign investment”.160 
Donor motivations for allocating aid vary. Whilst the promotion of economic 
development in recipient governments is typically one of the stipulated goals that 
foreign aid seeks to advance, it is not always the only one.161 Donor motivations vary 
from pure altruism and moral duty- e.g. concern for the poor, to the pursuit of national 
self-interest, such as national security and commercial gain.162 The debates relating to 
donor motivations for aid allocation can be summarised into the following categories: 
moral arguments; economic arguments; commercial and economic interests; political 
and strategic; and, to a lesser extent, national cultural objectives.  
                                                     
157 Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, development, 11. 
158 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 38. 
159 F. Tarp, Foreign aid and development: Lessons learnt and directions for the future (London: Routledge, 
2000), 2. 
160 Tarp, Foreign aid and development, 2. 
161 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 75. 
162 J. Eaton, “Foreign capital flows,” in Handbook of development economics, ed. H. Chenery, and T. 
Srinivasan, 55 (New York: Northholland, 2008); S. Browne, Beyond aid: From patronage to partnership 










   27 
 
 The moral arguments for foreign aid allocation are usually centred on providing 
support for economic and social progress, and the reduction of poverty.163 Lancaster 
shows how the moral argument behind the allocation of aid has been used as both a 
means and an end to promote  policy. The thinking around how aid achieves economic 
and social progress has evolved over the years. In the post-war period, aid was used to 
stabilise the economies of countries. In the 1970s, aid focused on redistribution among 
the poor. The 1980s, witnessed a shift of emphasis to aid playing a greater role, 
including a tool to undertake economic policy reforms in order to achieve economic 
growth.164 The decades following have witnessed a shift with poverty reduction playing 
a more prominent position in the allocation of aid.  
 As already mentioned, donor governments frequently pursue other motives by 
means of their aid programmes and allocations. A number of donors allocate aid in 
order to promote a particular religion, language or set of values. In such instances, 
foreign aid is allocated to recipients that demonstrate an interest in adopting the 
religion, language or values, and the accompanying practices and ideology.165 Diplomacy 
and ‘high politics’ are played out through aid, in order to advance foreign policy 
objectives, such as garnering support and votes in the UN, gaining diplomatic 
recognition or establishing military bases.166. Similarly, commercial and economic 
motives are advanced in various ways, including conditionality or tying the funds in 
such a way that they can only be utilised to procure goods and services in the donor 
country. Conditionality and the tying of aid is achieved in four ways:  
 
Firstly, ODA gra ts and loans … [are] provided on the premise that the recipient 
country returns the money with interest according to the financial terms 
stipulated in the loan agreement. Secondly, ODA grants and loans being provided 
by tying procurement of any goods or services to the donor country. Thirdly, 
ODA grants and loans may be tied for specific development projects under 
supervision of the donor. And lastly, the grant or loans … [are] distributed in 
accordance with the recipient country’s compliance with an agreed set of policies 
vis-à-vis the domestic economy.167 
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3.3 The aid-growth relationship 
Numerous scholars have deliberated on the relationship (if any) between aid and 
growth. This comes as no surprise, considering that the stimulation of economic growth 
is a major objective for foreign aid. The literature offers a variety of views on this 
matter. In summary, the views can be categorised as follows: there is no correlation 
between aid and growth; there is a positive correlation between aid and growth; and 
finally, a negative correlation between aid and growth 
An important general observation about foreign aid studies, is that most utilise 
econometric analysis to conduct cross-section studies at the macro-level, they make use 
of single-equation estimate techniques168. This method has produced various and often 
contradictory results. In fact, the technique has perpetuated what Mosley terms the 
‘micro-macro’ paradox, which conceals the differences that exist between the macro and 
micro levels169. Cassen et al note that studies conducted at the micro level, find aid to be 
more effective in stimulating growth and reducing poverty,  whilst those at the macro 
level have tended to yield ambiguous results, and often fail to find that aid has had any 
significant impact on growth.170  
 The belief that foreign aid promotes economic growth, rests on three premises: 
“firstly, that the key to economic development is the availability of capital; secondly, 
that underdeveloped countries are too poor to provide the capital for themselves; and 
thirdly, that centralised and comprehensive economic planning and control of 
government is an essential requisite for economic development”.171 However, as the 
discussion below will show, vigorous scholarly enquiry has both contested and 
supported these propositions.  
 The literature highlights the differences between growth and development. Of 
particular interest is the strand in the literature that asserts that growth can be 
achieved without development. The point of departure perhaps can be taken from 
Samuel who states that there is clear disjuncture between rhetoric and reality: “the 
performance of the economy, the increasing gap between the goal of macroeconomic 
development and social development and the complete lack of political will and 
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economic agenda for long-term social development show how the rhetoric belies 
reality. Growth without development will deepen inequality and have dangerous socio-
political consequences that could undermine the very essence of freedom and 
democracy”.172 
 
3.3.1 No correlation between aid and growth  
A number of studies have shown significantly low correlation coefficients between aid 
and growth. Griffen and Enos conducted empirical studies of 15 African and Asian 
countries based on the United Nations data for the period 1972-64.173 Their findings 
show that “foreign assistance is not associated with progress”.174 The authors go as far 
as to suggest that even if a nation achieves a degree of growth, none of it can be 
attributed to foreign aid. Griffen and Enos do not indicate what this growth can be 
attributed to. They do, however, admit that they provide little evidence to justify their 
propositions, their conclusions are supported only by the largely out-dated UN data. 
Lensink and Morrissey take a similar stance; they state that “if one finds an effect of aid 
on growth, it is likely that this arose at least primarily through a link between aid and 
investment” and not as a result of foreign aid. 175 
 Radelet et al also find that “aid has no effect on growth, and may actually 
undermine growth”.176 The findings presented by Mosley, Mosley et al and Boone 
provide similar accounts, which show little or no relationship between aid and 
growth.177 
 Radelet continues to identify other ways in which aid does not support growth. 
Firstly, foreign aid has been observed to serve and keep corrupt governments in power, 
thus creating an environment which is conducive for those governments to adopt poor 
economic policies and postpone reform. Secondly, foreign aid has all too often been 
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wasted by the elite governors of recipient nations. Thirdly, foreign aid has reduced both 
government and private saving. And, finally, aid is said to undermine private sector 
incentives to improve productivity or investment because it results in the currency of 
recipient nations appreciating, thereby undermining the profitability of tradable 
goods.178 The results of studies by Dowling and Hiemenz, Boone and Singh are similar 
those of Radelet et al in that they support the assertion that aid has no effect on growth 
in recipient nations.179 
 
3.3.2 Positive correlation between aid and growth  
Papenek conducted a cross-country regression analysis of 34 developing countries 
using data from the 1950s, and of 51 developing countries using 1960s data, to assess 
the impact of foreign resources on growth and on the relationship between foreign 
resources and savings.180 The results indicate that “aid, unlike domestic savings, can fill 
the foreign exchange gap as well as the savings gap”181. Unlike foreign private 
investment, aid is “specifically designed to foster growth, and more importantly, is 
biased toward countries with a balance-of-payments constraint”.182 Similarly, Levy, 
found there to be a strong, positive correlation between aid and economic growth, and 
between investments in Africa between 1968 and 1982.183  
Loxley and Sackey’s study of 40 African countries over a 28 year period indicates 
that aid has a positive impact on per capita income growth for the Continent as a 
whole.184 This study is particularly valuable as it involves a significantly larger sample 
than most other studies. In addition, the use of aid-growth stratification to categorise 
countries, and a transition matrix to highlight significant changes that may have 
occurred during the period under observation, produced significant data outcomes. The 
findings indicate that during the period 1975-1984, 12.5% of African countries could be 
classified as recipients of significant volumes of aid, with positive per income growth.185 
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Between 1995-2004, 13% of the countries sampled had moved from negative growth 
per capita income to positive growth, largely attributable to increases in aid. The most 
noteworthy growth occurred in Tanzania, Zambia and Chad.186 Burkina Faso, Gambia 
and Mali received high quantities of aid, and reflected significant increases in per capita 
income.187 The argument made by the authors is that the growth in per capita incomes 
would not have been realised without the infusion of aid into these countries, thus 
justifying their assertion that aid has a positive impact on growth. 
 International financial institutions such as the WB and the IMF, have concluded 
that simply allocating foreign aid directly to governments has proved insufficient for 
promoting economic development and growth. What is required is an appropriate 
policy environment.188 The WB’s 1998 study of 56 aid receiving countries found that 
those with “good policies (low inflation, a budget surplus and openness to trade) and 
good institutions (little corruption, strong rule of law, effective bureaucracy) benefit[ed] 
from the aid they got … (whilst) those with poor policies and institutions did not”.189 
Guillaumont and Chauvet concur, stating that if the policies “are good, aid will be 
efficient, if they are not, aid will be useless, at best”.190  
The WB emphasises a stable macroeconomic policy environment in particular, as 
necessary for rapid economic growth.191 Fischer suggests in a study published in 1993, 
that it is through macroeconomic stability that an environment that is conducive for 
growth is created.192 Such an environment is one that has the following features: “low 
and predictable inflation; appropriate real interest rates; real exchange rates which are 
competitive and predictable; stable and sustainable fiscal policy; and a balance of 
payments which is perceived as viable.193 Kormendi and Meguire's go further in their 
empirical investigation across a sample of 47 countries, using a set of macroeconomic 
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hypotheses relating to economic growth.194 They include additional factors such as 
monetary variance, risk-return trade-off in aggregate technology, supply side 
concerning the effects of government spending, the ‘openness’ of a country with respect 
to international trade, and inflation on capital stock.195  
 
3.3.3 Negative correlation between aid and growth  
Some scholars identify the effect of foreign aid on growth to be negative. Using 22 less-
developed countries for the period 1956-1968, Voivodas found aid to have had a 
negative impact on growth, although the negative effect was not so significant.196 
Voivodas concluded that economic growth could, instead, be explained by the “positive 
and significant contribution of exports”. Voivodas’ findings thereby refute Papenek’s 
position that growth is achieved by aid closing both the savings and foreign exchange 
gap in an economy.197   
 Weisskopf refutes the assertion made by scholars such as Chenery and Strout 
regarding foreign aid’s ‘additionality’ to domestic resources, as a benefit, serving to 
boost economic growth.198 According to Weisskopf, “foreign capital in form represents 
an addition to the total supply of resources available to a country[,] and thereby 
increases the possible magnitude of domestic expenditures”, which is not conducive for 
economic growth.199 Unlike Chenery and Strout, Weisskopf regards foreign aid as an 
additional resource, which only serves to stimulate domestic spending by recipient 
countries which does not encourage economic growth.200 Jepma also supports this 
position, stating that foreign aid crowds out private saving, supports public 
consumption, and has no significant impact on macroeconomic growth in recipient 
countries.201 Moss et al take this further, highlighting that foreign aid has had negative 
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effects on the development of institutions, what they term the ‘aid-institutions 
paradox’.202 The authors conclude that this is achieved as follows: 
states which can raise a substantial portion of their revenues from the 
international community are less accountable to their citizens and under less 
pressure to maintain popular legitimacy. They are therefore less likely to have 
the incentives to cultivate and invest in effective public institutions. As a result, 
substantial increases in aid inflows over a sustained period could have a harmful 
effect on institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa203 
 
Lavy and Sheffer’s examination of Egypt suggests that Egypt, after receiving 
exorbitant quantities of aid, is in fact worse off now than in the early 1970s.204 The 
infusion of these volumes of aid exceeded the country’s absorptive capacity and ability 
to utilise the aid effectively. In order to compensate for the excess of resources, the 
government of the time stimulated consumption through subsidies. Financial 
adjustments had to be made to facilitate this process. The long-term effects of this policy 
are devastating; it will take decades to reverse them.205 Morton’s assessment of the 
situation in Sudan, follows a similar line. Morton concludes that donors fail to consider 
the limited absorptive capacity of several developing countries, in this case the Sudan. 
Instead, “the volume of aid just grows and grows without regard for [the recipient’s] 
chances of being able put [the aid] to productive use”, for the purpose of economic 
growth.206  
 Bauer asserts that foreign aid does not directly benefit the very poor, as the 
funds are first directed to the recipient government.207 This method of transfer 
increases the government’s resources, patronage, and power in relation to the rest of 
society. “The resulting politicization of life enhances the hold of government over their 
subjects and increases the stakes in the struggle for power”.208 Foreign aid therefore, 
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“has enabled many governments to pursue policies that plainly retard economic growth 
and exacerbate poverty”.209 
 Boone studied the long-term effects aid for the period 1971 - 1990. He points out 
that aid does not significantly increase economic growth rates, investments or improve 
human development indices.210  Boone specifies two reasons why foreign aid does not 
encourage economic development: “poverty is not caused by capital shortage, and it is 
not optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid 
flows”.211 Boone’s observations demonstrate that aid increases consumption, but higher 
consumption does not benefit the poor.212 The infusion of resources in the form of food 
aid is, therefore, not an appropriate response to promote human development or 
alleviate poverty. Furthermore, there was an insignificant impact on human 
development indicators such as infant mortality and primary school enrolments. In 
summary, Boone notes that “even while particular programs such as immunization and 
research can be effective, the bulk of long-term aid programs have had little impact on 
human development and investment (which are pertinent for growth) between 1971 
and 1990”.213 Boone’s findings are consonant with the results of Friedman’s 1995 study. 
Though the objectives of foreign economic aid are commendable, Friedman argues, the 
means are, however, inappropriate to the objectives.214 “Foreign economic aid, far from 
contributing to rapid economic development along democratic lines, is likely to retard 
improvement in the well-being of the masses, to strengthen the government sector at 
the expense of the private sector, and to undermine democracy and freedom”.215 
Erixon draws much the same conclusions. Aid has largely been 
counterproductive over the past fifty years: “it has crowded out private sector 
investments, undermined democracy, and enabled despots to continue with oppressive 
policies, perpetuating poverty” and delaying much needed reform. 216 
Gani et al summaries the various arguments relating to the negative impact of aid 
into two schools of thought. The first school is derived from the Dependency Theory, 
                                                     
209 Bauer, The development frontier: Essays, 45-46. 
210 P. Boone, “Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid”, European Economic Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 
322. 
211 Boone, “Politics and the effectiveness,” 322 . 
212
 Boone, “Politics and the effectiveness,” 322. 
213 Boone, “Politics and the effectiveness,” 322. 
214 M. Friedman, “Foreign economic aid”, Yale Review 47, no. 4 (1982): 500-516 
215 Friedman, Foreign economic aid: Means, 16. 










   35 
 
according to which  underdevelopment is a state that characterises the periphery, and is 
achieved through exploitation by the developed market economies, which in turn, 
further entrench and perpetuate their dominance over the periphery. This reveals, 
therefore, that underdevelopment is not the absence of a process, but rather a state 
imposed on developing countries through the acts of the developed market 
economies.217 The second school, “claims that aid inevitably expands the role of 
government, distorts market signals and finances more investment than the private 
sector would undertake if it were given the chance”.218 
 
3.4 Aid effectiveness  
Aid effectiveness has been a recurring issue regardless of the objectives pursued, but 
more especially in relation to poverty reduction and economic growth. There are a 
number of factors that affect the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of foreign aid. These 
include: donor motivations for aid allocation; donor practices; donor-recipient 
relations; targeting of beneficiaries; the quantity and quality of aid; aid-types; and aid 
conditionality, to mention but a few. Irrespective of one’s view of foreign aid, there is 
general consensus that the role of foreign aid is to “assist poor nations in minimizing 
their levels of misery and deprivation so as to allow them to make improvements in 
their standard of living”.219 The effectiveness of aid programmes therefore, should be 
measured against these objectives, and should constantly refer to the need for 
sustainable results and poverty reduction.220 
 Most studies on aid effectiveness in Africa tend to conflate Africa with other 
countries of the developing world. The danger with this, is that they fail to fully “capture 
the reality [,] that Africa is quite unique in its socio-economic orientation compared to 
other developing regions in Asia and Latin America”.221 In the African context, the aid 
effectiveness debate has become more rampant within regional bodies, for example the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which has made calls for the 
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Continent to assess the efficacy of foreign aid as a tool for growth, and for domestic 
policy responses to be formulated.222 
  
3.4.1 Donor motivations and practices in aid allocation 
The World Bank’s recent Report entitled Assessing aid: What works, what doesn’t, and 
why, points out that foreign aid has had two objectives, right from the early years of the 
post-World War II era; the Report notes that these objectives are potentially 
incompatible: 
  
“The first objective was to promote long-term growth and poverty reduction in 
developing countries; the underlying motivation of donors was a combination of 
altruism and a more self-interested concern that in the long term, their economic 
and political security would benefit if poor countries were growing. The second 
objective was to promote the short-term political and strategic interests of donors. 
Aid went to regimes that were political allies of major Western powers. Thus the 
strategic and developmental objectives were potentially, but not necessarily, at 
odds”.223  
  
One can sum up the above as follows:  the allocation of foreign aid by donors has been 
motivated by two factors, namely ‘recipient need’ and the ‘donor interest’.224 Kim, on 
the one hand, argues that aid is a response to world poverty, that arose from ethical and 
humane concerns, and is an external manifestation of a ‘sense of obligation’ on the part 
of the rich for the disadvantaged.225 On the other hand, Mason argues that the strategic 
interests of the donor countries are the primary driver for aid, which means therefore 
that donor interests outweigh those of the recipients.226 Ruttan attempts to synthesise 
the two positions by stating that foreign aid has been used, both in the pursuit of 
domestic economic and strategic interests of donors, as well as out of the sheer  moral 
and ethical responsibility of residents of wealthy countries  towards residents of poor 
countries.227 McGillvray’s summation of the literature is that “developmental or 
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humanitarian concerns, including the reduction of poverty, [in fact] receive a relatively 
low or even zero weight” in donor’s considerations about the allocation of aid. 228 
According to Ruttan, both recipient need and donor interests cannot be discarded, on 
logical or theoretical grounds; arguing that empirical evident in support of both is weak, 
therefore, both feature as considerations in the allocation of aid.229  
 It has been argued that “if aid [was] to be allocated on the basis of recipient 
needs, the poorest countries should receive more, and the richest countries less”.230 
Findings presented by McKinley and Little suggest, however that aid policies are not 
necessarily geared towards providing assistance to the poorest countries.231 
Guillaumont and Chauvet propose that aid effectiveness is determined by 
environmental factors, which are exogenous to the recipient nations.232 These include, 
terms of trade trends, climatic shocks and exports instability. If aid is to be successful, 
donors should target nations ,which are not able to absorb external shocks because of 
their economic climates, which make them more vulnerable, and, therefore, are not able 
to meet their development priorities.233 
 It is evident therefore that donors ask two questions when they are considering 
aid allocations: Whether to allocate aid to a given potential recipient? And, in case of a 
positive answer, how much aid to give to this recipient?234 It is also suggested that 
donors pursue political and strategic interests, and allocate aid simply to complement 
the donor’s political strategy. Ruttan mention’s that one of the issues that need to be 
investigated further is the conflict between the short-term political strategic objectives 
for donors, versus the long-term political development gains for the recipient country, 
ultimately affects aid effectiveness.235 
 A similar argument, made by Alesina and Dollar, is that for donors, aid allocation 
is as much a political, as an economic decision. Examples of such political considerations 
include colonial ties, political alliances and the policy performance of the recipient. “An 
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inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony [but which 
is] politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another 
country with similar levels of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a 
colony”.236 Countries that have democratised, generally receive exponentially increased 
foreign aid by up to 50%.237 
Cline and Sargen challenge the literature’s earliest models for aid allocation, 
namely Chenery and Strout’s 1966 ‘two-gap’ model as well as Adel and Morris’ 
performance criteria approach. The ‘two gap’ model rests on the premise that aid 
contributes to the domestic saving gap that not only characterises developing nations, 
but is also the reason for their lack of economic development.238 According to this 
model, the gap in these regions is reflected in their respective investment and savings, 
which implies that developing countries have insufficient savings and/or foreign capital. 
The role that aid plays is that of a ‘filler’ for both the domestic savings basket (the 
internal gap), as well as the import gap (the external gap).239 Cline and Sargen’s critique 
of this model is based on the model’s assumption that recipients are equally in need. 
The model pays no regard to their differences in per capital income levels. Secondly, the 
model “introduces a negative incentive effect into allocation”240. The poorer the savings 
or export effort, the wider the gap and the larger the aid recommended”.241 Adelman 
and Morris are of the view that aid allocation should be determined by performance 
criteria.242 Cline and Sargen critique them for the following reasons: subjectivity in 
determining key variables such as ‘degree of commitment of leadership to promoting 
economic development,’ as well as its inconsistency in considering the element of equity 
in country allocation.243  
 According to Dollar and Levin, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, the 
Netherlands and Sweden give consideration to poverty levels in prospective recipient 
                                                     
236 A. Alesina, and D. Dollar, “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol 5 
(2000): 33 
237
 Alesina and Dollar, “Who gives foreign aid,” 34.  
238
 Chenery, and Strout, “Foreign assistance and economic,” 673-733. 
239 Chenery, and Strout, “Foreign assistance and economic,” 679-733. 
240
 W. Cline, and N. Sargen, “Performance criteria and multilateral aid allocation”, World Development 3, 
no. 6 (1975): 384 
241 Cline and Sargen, “Performance criteria and multilateral,” 384. 
242 I. Adelman, and C. Morris, “Performance criteria for evaluating economic development potential: an 
operational criteria”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, no. 2 (1968): 260-280 










   39 
 
countries, while France and the United States do not.244 This confirms Berthelemy’s 
view that all donors are not the same in their determination of aid allocation. They use 
different indicators, for example, recipient need and donor interest.245 
 The United States, as a major contributor of aid, is highly criticised for its motives 
for allocation. Zimmerman, for instance, argues that the US’s allocation of aid is not 
conducive for development, and is biased towards middle income countries.246 Alesina 
and Dollar’s studies find the US’s bilateral aid to be motivated principally by geopolitics 
(especially during the Cold War), and, secondly by commercial interests, and then 
followed by humanitarian concerns.247  
 Developing countries have appealed to donors to co-ordinate their efforts to 
improve aid effectiveness. It is envisioned that through collaboration, poverty reduction 
efforts may yield better outcomes and effect more significant levels of change. As the 
alleviation of poverty is an international public good, it is emphasised that the best way 
to achieve this, is through co-ordination and collaboration.248 However, there is 
downside to improving co-operation among donors, it may reduce the recipient 
government’s responsibilities.249  
 
3.4.2 Donor-recipient relationship 
The literature suggests that the nature of the relationship between donors and 
recipients has an impact on the effectiveness of foreign aid. According to a recent report 
by the World Bank’s Commission on International Development, which is entitled 
Partners in Development, “partnerships between the rich countries and the poor, as the 
latter struggle for development and poverty reduction, has been part of the approved 
rhetoric in the development community for a long time”.250 How this is to be achieve 
remains largely unexplained and unexplored. 
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 Whilst encouraging good relations between donors and recipients seems 
valuable, Patel mentions that:  
the concept of genuine partnership in development … lacks credibility … [as] 
there has never been any real sense of equality between donors and recipients [,] 
even when they attend the same consortium meetings and sit around the same 
table in many other forums. For the recipient to be frank about the policies or 
attitudes of donors in a forum where aid is to be distributed [,] is about as 
difficult as the proverbial passage of the camel through the eye of a needle. 
Criticism of donor policies, even when it comes from non-recipients, is seldom 
answered in the manner in which recipients are obliged to answer the most far-
reaching criticism of their own policies. There are obviously two sets of rules… A 
mere equality of opportunity in engaging in dialogue cannot establish parity in 
decision-making… The doctrine of mutuality in monitorship or genuine 
partnership in development is impractical.251 
 
The nature of aid assistance programmes has been heavily criticised for their 
donor-driven character. Some scholars point out that this is counterproductive for 
positive developmental output.252 Wangwe adds that in addition to the donor-driven 
agenda of programmes, a lack of recipient ownership, weak management capacity of 
recipients, and aid conditionality have compromised aid effectiveness.253 In order to 
change this, Mkandawire and Soludo want African countries to take more of the 
initiative, not only by developing ‘home-grown’ strategies, but also taking  it as their 
prerogative, that African countries should lay down the role and the nature of foreign 
aid in Africa, and not simply take directives from donors.254 Helleiner notes a 
“disconnect” between donor rhetoric regarding partnership and what happens in the 
field.255  
 
3.4.3 Quality and quantity of aid 
Lensink and White postulate that the quantity of aid inflows to a recipient is vitally 
important. According to them, an inflow of aid above a certain level has negative 
                                                     
251 I. Patel, “Aid relationship for the seventies,” in The widening gap: Development in the 1970s, eds.  B. 
Ward, L. D’Anjou, and J. Runnalls, 305 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). 
252 G. Helleiner, “External conditionality, local ownership and development,” in Transforming 
development: Foreign aid for a changing world, ed.  M. Freedman, 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006) 
253 S. Wangwe, Foreign aid, debt and development in sub-Saharan Africa (Tokyo: Economic and Social 
Research Foundation, 1998), 15. 
254 T. Mkandawire, and C. Soludo, “Our continent, our future: African perspectives on structural 
adjustment”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 1, no. 2 (1999): 121 
255
 G. Helleiner, “Towards balance in aid relationships: Donor performance monitoring in low-income 










   41 
 
implications for growth and effectiveness.256 This concern is also raised by other 
scholars, who posit that “high levels of aid may signify, or induce, aid dependence, 
rather than lay the basis for self-reliant development as aid is intended to [do]”.257  
 Interestingly, the hypothesis presented by Olsen et al suggests that the quantity 
or volume of assistance allocated to countries, particularly during emergency situations, 
is determined by three variables: firstly, the intensity of media coverage of the crisis; 
secondly, donor’s political interest in the emergency; and thirdly, the ability of 
humanitarian organisations within the affected country to respond.258   
 In addition to the quantity of aid, the quality of aid allocated affects aid 
effectiveness. There are significant accounts of the importance of the quality of aid 
allocation in the literature. Collier and Dollar, as well as Burnside and Dollar make the 
point that if aid is to achieve its goals and be more effective, it should be targeted to 
recipients that are most in need.259 
 
3.4.4 Multilateral versus bilateral aid 
Thiele et al test whether the provision of bilateral and multilateral aid is in line with the 
MDGs.260 Their results reflect that “donor patterns differ in the extent to which their 
sectoral aid allocation is conducive to achieving major MDGs”.261 Overall, aid has been 
directed towards the MDG relating to the fight against HIV/AIDS, while others, such as 
the MDG for primary education, have received less attention. This example shows the 
disparity between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation.262  
 In contrast to the work by Dollar and Levin, Canavire et al find no suggestion that 
multilateral aid is more poverty and policy oriented than bilateral aid.263 In fact, its was 
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found that the export-related self-interest of donor countries, as well as colonial ties 
provided strong incentives for the allocation of bilateral aid.264 
 Even though the allocation of aid may be determined by recipient need, to a 
greater or lesser extent, bilateral aid is more likely to be tailored to advance the 
economic and strategic interests of the donor.265 Cassens explains that “national interest 
is the most obvious donor motive in bilateral aid and that donors support countries 
with which they have strong cultural, economic, political and strategic ties”.266 
 Yasin differentiates the impact that aid has on growth, according to aid type-
whether multilateral or bilateral.267 Yasin’s panel data study of 11 sub-Saharan African 
countries during the period 1990-2003, carries out an assessment of the relationship 
between aid and FDI. (The importance of FDI in achieving growth cannot be overstated. 
In addition to it stimulating new technology, it creates new employment opportunities, 
unlocks external market opportunities for both the source and recipient nations, eases 
domestic capital flight abroad, and for the recipient has overall a positive impact on 
economic growth and productivity.)268 The results found bilateral aid to have a positive 
influence on FDI, which is stimulated through trade openness, growth of the labour 
force and exchange rates.269 Papanek and Schnieder and Frey support the positive 
relation between bilateral aid and FDI.270 For them, bilateral aid is usually allocated 
with a condition that the recipient country implement economic reforms. It is these 
economic reforms that create an environment that attracts FDI. Multilateral aid is not 
able to achieve this kind of growth. The “positive and significant influence of [official] 
bilateral … development assistance on foreign direct investment [,] is that the recipient 
countries [,] need to formulate policies that improve their economic relationship with 
the donor countries in order to attract greater foreign direct investment flows from the 
multilateral corporations located in these [i.e. donor] countries”.271 
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3.4.5 Aid-type 
It is only recently that Clemens et al and Mavrotas and Nunnekamp have made calls for 
aid to be disaggregated given the heterogeneity of foreign aid.272 It would be foolish, 
therefore, to assume that all types of aid would have the same effect in recipient 
countries. The importance of this is highlighted by Cassen, who emphasised that 
disaggregation could in fact change our understanding of how aid really works in 
practice.273 
 In addition to disaggregating aid according to the type of aid, the composition of 
aid should also factor-in differences in donor motivations and aid allocation, for “if aid is 
heterogenous [,] and each of its components is driven by different donor motives [,] and 
exerts different macroeconomic effects in the recipient countries, using a single figure 
for aid results in an aggregation bias that may blur empirical results”.274  
 Neumeyer emphasises the need to disaggregate aid, and the effectiveness 
thereof, according to the type of aid. As his study shows, the allocation and 
effectiveness, for instance, of food aid is significantly different to that of other forms of 
aid.275 However, Hopkins refutes Neumeyers hypothesis, stating that food aid as a 
resource is no different to any other form of aid.276 Dearden and Ackroyd go further in 
outlining the similarities between financial and food aid. According to them, both are 
resource transfers and there is no economic difference from the recipient between food 
or non-food aid assistance.277 
Gani and Clemes examine the relationship between aid type and human well-
being. Their findings reveal that aid directed to provide education and water correlate 
positively with human well-being in low-income countries.278 
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3.5 Aid and governance 
More recently, the relationship between aid and governance has been an issue of 
discussion in policy discourse. One cannot dispute that governance issues are crucial in 
achieving improvements in economic and social outcomes. It is by no coincidence that 
UN Security General, Kofi Annan stated that “good governance is perhaps the single 
most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”.279 In Africa, 
however, good governance remains elusive for many countries.280 Given that aid has 
come to play an important role in Africa, it seems natural that this dissertation unpacks 
the relationship (if any) that aid has on governance. The literature suggests that, while 
aid has played its part in improving institutions, economic management, delivering 
public goods and services, as well as increasing self-reliance, in some countries aid has 
failed to have any positive effect.  
 In the literature, there is general consensus about what governance is, and why it 
matters. Firstly, governance refers to a process. Secondly, governance exceeds the ambit 
of government, and involves the nature of relationship between the state and society. 
And thirdly, governance refers to the set of rules that regulate public life.281 Good 
governance therefore refers to “the form of institutions that establish a predictable, 
impartial and consistently enforced set of rules for investors”, as well as clear 
separation of powers between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive organs of 
the government.282   
 
3.5.1 Favourable incentives for governance 
There is some evidence that foreign aid has improved and increased the ability of 
African states to govern well.283 This has been achieved through policy advice, training 
and education programmes that have infused innovative ideas about governance and 
management. Goldsmith adds that “African policymakers today express far more 
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favourable attitudes towards markets and competitive politics than they did in the past. 
The spread of liberal ideas is partly attributable to foreign aid”.284 
 
3.5.2 Unfavourable incentives for governance 
The literature highlights how aid has impede governance in the Continent. According to 
Goldsmith, Africa “makes disappointing political and administrative headway- this 
despite a growing amount of Africa’s aid being earmarked to improve the quality of 
government”.285 For Knack, aid undermines the quality of governance because it 
“weaken[s] accountability, encourag[es] rent-seeking and corruption, foment[s] conflict 
over control of aid funds, siphon[s] off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and 
alleviat[es] pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions”.286 Knack 
demonstrates his argument by using cross-country data which provides evidence for 
the erosion of the quality of governance using indices such as the rule of law, corruption 
and the quality of the bureaucracies.   
 Brautigam, points out that, if governance is to be improved, good leadership and 
good institutions are essential.287 Unfortunately, in African many counties lack such 
institutions, which means that aid has failed to facilitate the development of those 
prerequisites. Instead, the high volumes of aid that have been delivered to countries 
with weak institutions, have generated greater institutional problems so that the 
effectiveness of government institutions is not improved.288 “In aid dependent 
countries, donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the critical 
functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership vision, 
using foreign experts and project management unites in place of weak and decaying 
public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation and 
maintenance is neither planned for nor affordable”.289 In such cases, foreign aid 
hampers growth, rather than being a part of the solution.  
 The volume of aid that a recipient receives affect dependence and the impact on 
governance. Aid dependence, as defined by Brautigam, refers to a “situation in which a 
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country cannot perform many of the core functions of government, such as operations 
and maintenance, or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding or 
expertise”.290 Lensink and White extend this definition by adding that “a country is aid 
dependent if it will not achieve objective X in the absence of aid for the foreseeable 
future”.291 Statistical analysis using OECD data indicates that there is a significant 
negative relationship between quality of governance and volume of aid received.292 This 
is because aid when received over a sustained period of time, can compromise good 
governance and institutional performance.   
The literature also suggests that aid has been found to increase political 
instability, because controlling a government is more important to a donor country than 
promoting good governance in a recipient country. Maren attributes Somalia’s civil 
wars to competition for control over the government, and large-scale food aid.293 
Political instability is not conducive to good governance, nor does it create an 
environment which enables growth.  
Aid creates what Moss et al refer to as an ‘aid-institutions paradox’.294 Foreign 
aid is said to decrease the incentive for a recipient government to invest in effective 
institutions, because the government is not accountable to its citizens for the use made 
of resources which are sourced externally. There is little pressure on government to 
retain popular legitimacy.295 Moss et al focus on the adverse effects that aid has on the 
one of the primary functions of the state – the collection of revenues. This function is 
vital, as “the ability of the state to collect revenues is critically linked to state capacity … 
[T]he central role of revenue collection in political development and state-building has 
long been accepted”.296 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has surveyed some of the literature on foreign aid. It has focused on the 
aid-growth relationship, the aid-governance relationship, and aid effectiveness, in 
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particular. The various perspectives presented in this chapter show that the correlation 
between aid and growth can be negative, positive or null. Put differently, aid can deter 
growth, stimulate growth or have no impact at all.  
 The chapter noted that the effectiveness of aid is also affected by other factors: 
donor motivations; donor practices; donor-recipient relationships; and aid-type to 
mention a few.  
 The impact that aid has on governance and governments was also raised. In 
some instances, aid has encouraged good governance, and in others, it has undermined 
accountability, increased patronage and ultimately compromised institutional efficacy 
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CHAPTER 4 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FOREIGN AID IN AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the costs and benefits of foreign aid in Africa. A number of case 
studies are used for illustrative purposes. This is necessary given the significant and 
seemingly permanent role that aid has come to play in the Continent. The challenges 
that African governments face include economic stagnation, underdevelopment, 
financial volatility, humanitarian catastrophes, and conflicts.297 The question, therefore, 
is whether aid has proved beneficial or destructive in the context of ameliorating these 
and other challenges.  
 
4.2 Aid-growth relationship 
The ability of foreign aid to stimulate economic growth has been the subject of major 
debate. A survey of the literature indicates that whilst foreign aid has yielded growth in 
some recipient countries, it has had negative impacts on growth in others.  
There is a school of thought that sees foreign aid as having a positive impact of 
growth. Carlsson et al are of this persuasion.298 They cite the case of Botswana to 
demonstrate that aid can act as a catalyst in boosting economic growth.299 Botswana is a 
“successful example” of a positive relationship between foreign aid and economic 
growth.300  
Before it became independent, and prior to receiving any foreign aid, Botswana 
was one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income of US$240.301 
Minimal investments made by the colonialists, and great social and economic inequality 
are not conditions which would favour growth.302 According to Lindgred’s data, 
Botswana’s per capita GDP was US$407 in 1820, compared to US$1453 in Italy, 
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US$1508 in France and US$1946 in Germany.303 By independence, GDP had risen to 
$1119, a marginal increase when compared with that of Italy, France and Germany’s 
GDP which grew to US$9504, US$13187 and US$14731, respectively.304 Average life 
expectancy in Botswana was low, 34 years, compared to 38 years in Germany.305 
Botswana’s society was considered to be among the most hierarchically stratified of any 
in the Southern African region.306 It is significant that unemployment, especially for 
rural populations that were dependent on the earnings of migrant workers, was 
significantly high.307  
Botswana’s economic performance has been transformed; it now bears little 
resemblance to its pre-independence status. Much of the success that this small 
landlocked country has enjoyed is due to the transformations that the government has 
implemented, made possible by foreign aid. Beginning in the 1960s, Botswana received 
funding from the United States and the British Government.308 Foreign aid provided the 
means that enabled the government to diversify the economy. As a result of receiving 
aid for some three decades, from 1965 to 1985, Botswana has experienced “the most 
rapid rate of growth of gross national product (GNP) per capita (8.3%) of any country in 
the world”.309 So significant was the growth that the today the country is a “middle-
income country with a GDP per capita of over USD 2000”.310  
Botswana’s improved through the establishment of infrastructure. According to 
the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the Botswana Government adopted 
social and economic reforms that boosted government revenue and spending, resulting 
in dramatic increase from US$34 million, in 1970, to US$ 2 billion, in 1994.311 Indicators 
of social wellbeing relating to education, health, mortality rates also showed significant 
improvement. The number of people living below the poverty line, decreased by more 
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than 10%.312 Infant mortality rates fell from 98 per 1000 births in 1970, to 38 per 1000 
in 1998.313 Life expectancy at birth showed similar improvement, increasing from 55 
years in 1971, to 67 years in 1997.314 
 From the outset, Botswana’s Government priorities were “ending grants-in-aid 
from Britain; diversifying sources of aid to reduce dependence on one donor; and 
attracting private foreign investment”.315 In the beginning, up to 50% of the 
Government’s budget to develop transportation, human resource development, 
agriculture and emergency food relief, was financed by aid. It is estimated that aid 
inflows peaked at US$ 240 milllion in the 1980s, when Botswana was the highest 
recipient of aid in the world.316 By 1993, only 5% of the Government’s expenditure was 
provided by aid, compared to 45% in 1973 and 20% in 1982.317 Botswana’s economic 
breakthrough has seen it phased out as a recipient of foreign aid.318 It is hardly 
conceivable that this small country, which had a been one of the poorest in the world 
prior to independence, now  boasts an economy which grew by of 7.5% annually from 
1970 to 2004, and since has been the largest global producer of diamonds.319 So great 
has the positive impact that foreign aid, that according to Williams, Botswana now has 
“the best credit risk on the Continent, a risk competitive with countries in central 
Europe and East Asia”.320 
 Ghana presents another example of the positive role that foreign aid can play in 
improving economic growth. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ghana experienced 
a severe socioeconomic crisis: economy weakened as there were  substantial declines in 
real GDP per capita.321 According to the African Development Bank (ADB), “the 
country’s ability to fi ance growth was restricted by low domestic savings, poor 
performance of export commodities, and decline in capital inflows”.322 Inflation 
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management was ineffective despite attempts at intervention.323 Economic 
deterioration eroded social infrastructure, healthcare, education, transportation and 
communication; and, the Government lacked the resources need to transform the 
country.324  
Between 1983 and 1990, reforms that were made possible by foreign aid, 
encouraged 5% growth of real GDP. Inflation declined from 142% to 36% and “the 
overall balance of payments also went from a large deficit to a significant accumulation 
of international reserves".325 Macroeconomic stability and debt relief were achieved 
through sound macro policies.326  
According to the IMF, “Ghana is entering a new phase in its economic 
development where it has a historic opportunity to accelerate growth so that within a 
decade it can reach the MDGs and move to middle income status”.327 
 Intervention in the agricultural sector resulted in growth at an “annual rate [on 
average] of 2.8% [between] 1984-90 … [of] 2.7% in the early 1990s, and [of] 4.4% in the 
second half of the 1990s”.328 The benefits of the continued growth of the agricultural 
sector had a ripple effect on the overall economy, which witnessed an annual growth 
rate of 5.7% between 1983 and 1989 and 4.4% in the 1990s.329  
 Budget allocations to the social sector have reduced poverty in Ghana. According 
to the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 38% of Ghana’s population lived below the 
poverty line in 1988. This rate had fallen to 31.4% 4 years later.330 Surveys conducted in 
2001, indicate the consumption per capita and incomes rose by 12% in the 1990s.331 
The levels of education ha e risen by over 27% (previously 53% of the population had 
been illiterate), which has led to a 3% increase in per capita consumption.332  
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There is another school of thought that argues that foreign aid has a negative 
impact on growth. Some scholars go as far as to suggest that foreign aid has had a 
devastating effect on Africa’s growth. Tanzania is such a case that illustrates the harm 
that foreign aid and donors can have on economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
economic strategy pursued during the first five years following independence was 
inspired by the World Bank.333 According to the strategy as laid out in the Arusha 
Declaration, priority was given to “promoting egalitarian development, rural 
development, provision of basic needs for the masses … [by] plac[ing] the major means 
of production, distribution and exchange under the control of the State”.334 The country 
faced significant challenges because of poverty and inequalities. It was urgent therefore  
that the basic needs of the population were address. It was envisaged that aid would 
serve to support this strategy, by encouraging growth and self-reliance. Much of the aid 
that Tanzania received was earmarked for economic infrastructure to provide power, 
roads, railways and clean water.335 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Tanzania was the major recipient of bilateral aid, 
which averaged around US$27.1 million annually.336 Over the years, however, aid 
inflows were unpredictable and did not match what had been stipulated in the 
agreements between the donors and the Government of Tanzania. Aid flows gradually 
dropped from US$700 million in 1982, to US$490 in 1985.337 This meant that there 
were insufficient funds and resources to support the growth and development strategy. 
Consequently, the period 1973-1988 saw Tanzania’s economy contract at an average 
rate of 0.5% a year, and average personal consumption declined by 43% over a 20 year 
period when an estimated $10 billion were received in aid.338 The effects continue to be 
felt in Tanzania, where up to 36 million people still live on an average annual per capita 
income of $290.339  
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Tanzania remains dependent on foreign aid, it has been unable to becoming 
economically self-reliant340 Tanzania no longer has ownership of its own development 
agenda.341 According to Rotarou and Ueta, approximately 40% of the national budget 
and 80% of the development budget is funded by foreign aid, which makes it one of the 
country’s most dependent on aid.342 In addition, “the net ODA/gross national income 
(GNI) ratio has increased from 10.6% in 2005 to 17.4% in 2007.343 
 Foreign aid has not had an impact of poverty reduction, nor helped  Tanzania’s 
advance towards meeting the MDGs.344 Rotarou and Ueta point out that despite 
receiving significant volumes of aid, “is still one of the poorest countries in the world 
[and faces] many challenges to its economic development”.345 The 1999 Tanzania 
Human Development Report noted that the country ranked 156 out of 174 countries in 
the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1999. Furthermore, 51% of the population live 
on less than $1 a day, and about 42% of those live in absolute poverty on less than $0.75 
cents a day.346 Life expectancy at birth is 47.9 years, compared to 52.0 years in Kenya.347  
 In light of the above, the researcher observes that foreign aid has had negative 
effects on growth as well as poverty reduction, as the situation in Tanzania shows. It is 
recommended therefore, that Tanzania and other countries in a similar predicament 
should perhaps look for alternative sources to finance development.  
   
4.3 Aid effectiveness 
A large proportion of the literature on foreign aid seeks to assess whether aid works or 
not. Success in redressing poverty is a frequently used measure of assessing the 
effectiveness of aid. One school of thought has it that aid is indeed effective in reducing 
poverty, as well as in encouraging economic growth. On the other hand, some scholars 
posit that foreign aid has proved unsuccessful on both fronts.  
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 Some scholars argue that “aid can help governments more quickly and effectively 
meet with development objectives, and can improve the standard of living of the 
poor”.348 Proponents include Jeffery Sachs, who alludes to the ability of aid to fight 
poverty by encouraging economic growth; and Stiglitz and Stern, who campaign in 
support of foreign aid, because it has been effective in the relieving of poverty in many 
countries349 According to these scholars, as a result of foreign aid, indices which rate 
education and health have risen. Thus, aid has in some instances, become part of the 
solution to Africa’s challenges. 350   
The World Bank Report entitled Assessing aid: What works, what doesn’t and why 
states that “poverty reduction in developing countries is closely related to per capita 
income growth”.351 Loxley and Sackey, for example, hypothesize that aid has reduced 
poverty as a result of the positive impact that it has had per capita income growth.352 
Using a sample of 40 countries over a 28 year period, the authors demonstrate how aid 
receiving countries experienced growth in from 3.8% in 1974-84, to 6% in 1985-94.353 
An opposing school of thought demonstrates the costs that foreign aid has 
inflicted on recipient countries. Zambia is a case in point. Zambia experienced increased 
poverty and economic stagnation due to aid. Zambia has received foreign aid for a 
considerable length of time. Aid has been directed to reducing poverty. The economic, 
social and productive sectors have received a substantial share of aid as well.354 
According to the Zambian Government, poverty is “lack of access to income, 
employment opportunities, normal internal entitlements by citizens to such things as 
freely determined consumption of goods and services, shelter and other basic needs of 
life that include education.”355 However, as the study conducted by Saasa and Carlsson 
demonstrates, poverty reduction remains largely ‘unaccomplished’ in Zambia.356 The 
immediate  post-independence era from 1964 to the early 1970s registered growth and 
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economic prosperity largely due to copper’s performance in global markets. However, 
from the mid-1970s, the tide turned.357 The combination of external shocks from the oil 
crisis, a decline in copper prices, and a failed attempt to diversify Zambia’s economy, 
reversed the gains of. Consequently, social indicators fell, inflation boomed, while GDP 
stagnated. This should come as no surprise. The influx of any large sum of money into 
any economy, no matter how advanced, presents problems. Moyo built an argument on 
this observation that aid magnifies such problems as mentioned above, especially in 
countries that are “by their very nature, poorly managed, weak and susceptible to 
outside influence, over which [outside influence] domestic policymakers have little 
control”.358 
The volume and composition of aid received by Zambia has been conditional. It is 
dependent on the reform of its economy as a means of reducing poverty. Financial 
support has fluctuated depending on the extent to which Zambia has embraced reforms 
suggested by outsiders. For instance, when the Government adopted structural 
adjustment programmes between 1983 and 1987, Zambia was rewarded assistance. 
However, when the Government decided to abandon the IMF/World Bank supported 
SAPs, many donors withdrew support.359 The fluctuation in aid flow crippled Zambia’s 
growth potential. Despite a steady increase in aid since 1973, poverty reduction and 
economic stimulation have not been realised. Zambia’s economic performance has been 
negatively affected. 
Zambia, like  Mozambique, Uganda and Mali, is classified as one of the most 
indebted in the low-income category. Much of the debt was incurred in the 1970s, “with 
the debt overhang emerging in the 1980s when economic performance started to 
deteriorate rapidly and the balance of payments position continued to worsen”.360 Over 
time, Zambia’s external debt stock has increased. It reached S$ 3.7 billion in 1992, 
US$4.2 billion in 1994 and US$7.143 million in 1997. In 1996 however, aid had declined 
by 70% to US$636 million. 361 
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The percentage for those living below the poverty line has continued to increase. 
In 1991, the figure stood at 69.7%, soaring to 73.8% by 1993.362 This burgeoning of 
poverty has occurred despite the fact that social infrastructure has received a significant 
share of aid. In fact in 1995, contributions to this sector stood at US$191 million.363 
Even though donors supported the development of economic infrastructure, the 
economy has failed to improve.364 The deterioration was so harsh that in 1985, the 
World Bank demoted the country from the status of low-middle income to low-
income.365 By 1992, after receivng aid for many decades, inflation had reached 190%.366 
It is evident therefore that in the case of Zambia, there is no positive correlation 
between aid and the stimulation of economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 Opponents of foreign aid question the motives underlying aid allocation by 
donors, which so often do not favour growth in recipient nations; and rather seek to 
advance the economic, commercial, strategic and political interests of donors. According 
to Murithi, “the reality in Africa is that aid to a large extent is synonymous with 
influence peddling, which is in effect a hidden form of manipulations, control and 
coercion – or colonialism”.367 It is clear that donors do manipulate the terms according 
to which aid is allocated to suit their agenda, rather than take a directive from the 
recipient.  
Traditionally, foreign aid has been viewed as a temporary intervention, on the 
part of donors, which complements the recipient nation’s efforts. Foreign aid has 
become a more permanent feature in Africa’s development trajectory. The number of 
countries dependent on foreign aid has increased significantly. Some scholars go as far 
as to state that “aid has become a considerable force in the national economy, making 
countries more or less completely dependent on it”.368 The 1995 World Bank 
Development Report provides some insight into the magnitude of some states’ 
dependence on aid, by analysing the percentage of a recipient’s GNP that is derived from 
foreign aid. In 1995, aid constituted a significant 40% of Tanzania’s GNP, while Zambia 
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reflected 23.6%, Berkina Faso 23.6% and Mali with 13.5%.369 Mozambique, a recipient 
of significant volumes of foreign aid is heavily aid dependent, with over 53% of its 
population living below the poverty line. Similar situation can be said for Malawi, where 
60% of the population live below the poverty line, and the country is heavily dependent 
on aid.370 This dependency on aid has distorted the Continent’s development efforts 
considerably, either by producing the ‘Dutch disease’ or by lessening the “autonomy and 
resilience of national institutions by ... [the systemic]devalu[ation of] indigenous 
capacities, technologies, and cultures”.371 
 Erixton summarises the negative effects that foreign aid has had. Recipient 
nationals have derived little benefit from aid. Instead, “it has crowded out private sector 
investments, undermined democracy, and enabled despots to continue with oppressive 
policies [that], perpetuat[e] poverty”.372  
 
4.4 Aid and governance 
The literature indicates that aid can have an impact on governance. As we have seen 
repeatedly, some scholars document the positive aspects, while others highlight the 
negative consequences.   
 One school of thought asserts that aid has the ability to stimulate effective 
government reform. It is through this reform enabled by foreign aid, that progress can 
be made towards addressing challenges relating to economic growth, development and 
governance. A number of surveys point out that “little progress can be made in African 
countries unless their governments are strongly committed to development rather than, 
say, personal enrichment”.373 Some authors make the claim that foreign aid has yielded 
benefits when in government’s establish priorities, implement policies and develop 
institutions.374  
The Ugandan case illustrates  how effective governance can make systematic 
changes which improve the lives of the poor. With a history of brutal war and 
consequent poverty, the Ugandan Government was able not only to reduce the number 
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of people living below the poverty line from 56% to 38%; it has also been able to 
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, it reduced the prevalence from 18% to 6%, between 
1995 and 2005.375 Whilst credit is due to the Government, much of the progress made 
would not have been realised were it not for the large amounts of foreign aid and 
technical support which complement home-grown programmes. Aid provided the 
requisite resources and assistance that the country was unable to come up with on its 
own.   
 Foreign aid has supped the transition to democracy; Mali, Ghana, Mozambique 
and Benin are cases in point.376 Funds derived through aid have supported the 
democratic process, generated economic momentum and sustained constituency 
interest during the transition period. Aid was also used, for example, to finance voter 
registration, the drafting of new constitutions, judicial reform and the strengthening of 
civil society organisations.377 In summary, foreign aid has acted as a resource to 
“countries starting down a democratic path (that) often lack the institutions [necessary] 
to implement the basic functions of democracy”.378 
Mali’s democratic transformation provides a valuable case study. Mali is one of 
the poorest countries in the world. According to Siegle, “development assistance 
provided to Mali’s new democracy” demonstrates how aid can “enable the simultaneous 
pursuit of economic reforms, poverty alleviation, and the building of democratic 
institutions”.379 Prior to receiving foreign aid, Mali endured 23 years under one party 
military rule. 380 Between 1980 and 1990, which was during the period of military rule, 
per capita income shrank by 20% to a low US$250. Konare was appointed as president 
of Mali in 1992 as a result of discontent with President Traore’s leadership. Central to 
the new leadership was the “rooting out corruption, ending entrenched patronage, 
increasing taxes, scaling back public expenditures and privatizing a number of public 
enterprises, among other reforms”.381 Donors provided foreign aid to support the 
proposed reform programmes. Chief amongst these were plans to increase primary 
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school enrolments, to improve the social infrastructure, (for example the public health 
care system), as well as vigorous economic restructuring.382  
The reform process has encouraged Mali’s democratic development. According 
to the Freedom House democracy indices, Mali is categorised as a democracy 
undergoing consolidation, meaning that the country has “established democratic 
political systems and ... [is]  in the process of institutionalizing these processes to a point 
where autocratic reversions are highly unlikely”.383 Economic reforms have also 
resulted in the economy growing by 2.5%, and there has been a reduction of inflation of 
16%. Inflation dropped from 23% to 7% by 1996.384 In essence, the establishment of 
democracies, has been translated into economic growth and improvements of living 
conditions.385  
The literature provides accounts of the negative consequences that foreign aid 
has had for governance. For example, how aid limits many recipients’ ability to define 
and create their own policy space. Many recipients have had little choice, as to how the 
aid they receive should be utilised, as well as the policy framework through which it 
should take place. Many donors, in fact, prescribe policies, and the recipient 
“governments have little choice but to follow the guidelines … even though the policy 
priorities and implementation mechanisms that emerge from those templates may not 
be their own”.386 In the long-term, this has not been conducive to stimulating and 
developing African solutions to African. Prescriptive top-down policies that the donors 
demand be followed, do not allow for local innovation and ownership. Much aid carries 
the donor agenda, which will often clash with that of the recipients.387 Consequently, 
there is a huge gap between local interpretations and external assessments of what 
Africa’s challenges and solutions are. This is a major problem.   
The infusion of foreign aid has also been linked to a weakening of democratic 
accountability. Knack suggests that “by expanding the government’s resource envelope, 
aid reduces (the government’s) need to explain its actions to its citizens, which may 
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reduce its need to govern well”.388 Furthermore, poor governance leads to a 
deterioration of the institutions which are necessary for maintaining a good investment 
environment, as the government is unable to maintain the rule of law, or limit  
corruption, or uphold the independence of the judiciary.389 While aid seeks to build 
internal capacity in recipient countries, it can produce negative consequences, for 
example it can undermine “the idea of shared accountability of the executive and 
legislative branches”. All too often, parliament is not involved in the distribution of 
foreign aid, which means that the executive arm of government is not held to account in 
the Legislature.390 Mwenda uses Uganda to demonstrate how “foreign aid and debt 
relief can exacerbate problems by postponing reforms and the emergence of a 
transparent and accountable government”.391 Foreign aid seemingly provides a source 
of “unearned” revenue, which constitutes up to 50% of the national government’s 
budget. The recipient government does not have to disclose this revenue to its citizenry, 
nor is it accountable to them for its use.392 As a result, government’s divert public 
resources to service other needs, which usually benefit those who are in line for political 
patronage line. So rife is this problem, that about 20%, or US$40 million, of the annual 
expenditure which had been allocated for use by the military, was either unaccounted 
for, or lost because of corruption. It is argued that foreign aid has increased the 
magnitude of this problem. The argument proposes that in the absence of foreign aid, 
recipient government’s would be less inclined to misappropriate or mismanage funds, 
and would be more accountable to their constituencies.  
Corruption has become endemic throughout Africa. It is more prevent in aid 
receiving countries. Much of the literature attributes the association of corruption and h 
foreign aid to a breakdown between the different tiers within government as well as 
between government and its constituencies. Mwenda notes how corruption has affected 
the rollout of essential services and public goods, for example education. In Uganda, for 
instance, corruption was so deeply entrenched that only 13% of the Country’s education 
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budget ever reached schools.393 The rest was “captured by local officials and 
politicians”.394  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the costs and benefits of foreign aid to Africa. On the one 
hand, foreign aid has improved economic development and governance, and had helped 
reduce poverty by developing social infrastructure. On the other hand, aid has 
undermined economic growth, encouraged corruption, and choked local markets.   
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This dissertation analysed the costs and benefits of foreign aid in Africa. Foreign aid 
literature indicates that whilst aid has been a catalyst in realising positive economic 
growth and development in some cases; in others, aid has retarded growth, increased 
dependency and exacerbated poverty (despite the fact that aid is allocated to promote 
economic growth and reduce poverty).395 The purpose of this dissertation was not to 
provide solutions to the Continent’s challenges regarding economic growth and 
development, but rather sought to contribute to the on-going debate about the role that 
foreign aid plays in Africa. 
The aid debate has raged for over 45 years.396 Much of the literature attempts to 
assess whether aid has worked in terms of achieving its stated objectives of stimulating 
economic growth and reducing poverty.397 In keeping with the dominant discussions in 
the literature, this dissertation highlighted pertinent issues that were central to the aid 
debate in the context of Africa’s development.  
Chapter one introduced the dissertation and set the contextual background for 
the study. Despite receiving the largest share of global aid for several decades, much of 
Africa has seen little improvement in economic growth and poverty reduction.398 
Instead, economies seem to have stagnated, and poverty become more pronounced as 
income per capita has continued to decline faster in Africa than in any other region.399 
On the one hand, there are cases like Botswana, which demonstrate foreign aid’s 
potential to play a positive role in the development of a country. Foreign aid enabled 
Botswana to realise a 4% increase in economic growth, which transformed the economy 
and provided resources for the government to develop infrastructure, as well as 
improve access to schools and health.400  
On the other hand, there are cases like as Mozambique and Malawi, which 
demonstrate foreign aid’s destructive effect on recipient nations. Despite receiving 
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significant volumes of aid, the number of those living below the poverty line has 
increased, and both countries are heavily dependent on aid.401   
Chapter two analysed Africa’s economic and development context. One argument 
was that there a number of features that are unique to Africa that increase the 
Continent’s vulnerability in the face of a myriad of challenges. These have been the basis 
upon which foreign aid has been justified. Put differently, Africa’s colonial history, the 
nature of most states, poor economic performance, susceptibility to crises of legitimacy 
and political instability, have increased the Continent’s vulnerability and provided the 
context and need for the infusion of aid.  
Chapter three provided a review of the literature on foreign aid. As a point of 
departure, the chapter conceptualised the term foreign aid according the official 
definition provided by the DAC of the OECD. In addition, the various schools of thought, 
which have deliberated over the justification of aid, were discussed. These included the 
economic arguments, as well as those of a moral nature. The chapter summarised the 
major themes in the literature under three categories: aid-growth relationship; aid 
effectiveness; and, aid and governance.   
Chapter four analysed the costs and benefits of foreign aid using case studies, for 
the purpose of illustration. Overall, it seems that whilst foreign aid has provided the 
requisite resources for transformation of institutions, governments and social 
infrastructure, in some cases; it has also exacerbated corruption, curtailed legitimacy 
and accountability of the government to its citizens and compromised economic growth 
and poverty reduction, in others.  
Chapter five has highlighted the general arguments presented in the dissertation 
and concludes the study.  
Overall, it was argued that Africa continues to depend on aid. While aid has 
generated some benefits, such as the case of Botswana, it has also hampered and 
devastated prospects for economic growth and development, as demonstrated by cases 
such as Zambia. It  is for these reasons, that this dissertation calls for governments, 
policy makers and scholars alike to seek to find better alternatives to foreign aid, and in 
so doing mitigate the Continent’s heavy dependence on aid. 
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